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SAFETY ATTITUDES AND 
BEHAVIORAL INTENTIONS OF 
MUNICIPAL WASTE DISPOSAL DRIVERS
Stephen M. Swartz 
University of North Texas
Matthew A. Douglas 
University of North Texas
ABSTRACT
The Theory of Planned Behavior was used to study factors useful for predicting Behavioral 
Intentions to commit unsafe acts while driving for commercial drivers working for municipal waste 
management operations centers. The Theory of Planned Behavior was found to be moderately 
effective in predicting behavioral intentions, particularly through the constructs of Attitude and 
Perceived Control. Driver perceptions of safety climate, self-assessed personal safety performance, 
risk aversion, and attitudes toward behavioral factors associated with engaging in risky behaviors 
while operating motor vehicles were studied. Risk aversion and driver perception of their own safety 
performance were also useful predictors of intention.
INTRODUCTION
Once a week, employees of the firm responsible 
for safely and efficiently removing your 
household waste stop at your house, dump your 
trash or recycling into their truck, and drive 
off. The same thing has happened all your life 
and you’ve probably thought little of it. Many 
frustrated drivers race around slow-moving or 
stopped refuse or recycling trucks every day, 
unaware that this action is one of the leading 
causes of death for waste management 
employees. Despite the common presence of 
municipal disposal equipment and people on 
our streets, it seems few have sought to 
understand the challenging environment in 
which they work.
Very little research in waste management 
driving safety exists in the academic literature. 
Most academic research is focused on the 
occupational hazards of employees who work in 
hazardous waste management or waste 
management facilities (e.g., Akbar-Khanzadeh 
& Regent, 1999; Betsinger, Brosseau, & Golden, 
2000). Perhaps this trend is justified, but waste 
management drivers face a complex driving 
environment and more needs to be done to 
understand driving safety in this context.
Much reading on waste management driving 
safety is found in the trade magazines. Waste 
management companies understand the perils 
of driving a Waste Management Vehicle (WMV) 
and the grim consequences associated with
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unsafe driving. The companies must take 
driving safety seriously; the consequences for 
poor safety management practices can be very 
high. Many companies hold regular safety 
meetings, require their drivers to view safety 
videos, and put drivers through rigorous initial 
and annual driver safety training. Companies 
even educate the public about how to drive 
around WMVs. Moreover, the National Solid 
Waste Management Association (NSWMA) 
launched a safety video campaign in 2007. The 
episodes of the “Be Safe, Be Proud” campaign 
were designed to increase focus on the critical 
role of supervisors in influencing safety 
(Kilduff, 2007).
The industry’s initiatives to enhance driver 
safety are laudable. But how much do we really 
know about how the initiatives influence the 
safety attitudes and behaviors of waste 
management drivers? Companies must 
understand how to tailor their safety programs 
and practices to influence drivers’ safety 
behaviors. In order to accomplish that task, 
companies must first understand the attitudes 
and behavioral intentions of their drivers. 
Simply put, companies must understand what 
makes their drivers tick.
Objective, rigorous attitudinal and behavioral 
research is difficult, particularly in the driver 
safety context. But research in other fields has 
provided the tools to assess drivers’ personal 
attitudes and behavioral intentions. 
Organizational safety climate has been linked 
to employees’ safety attitudes and behaviors 
(e.g., Zohar, 1980). Furthermore, the Theory of 
Planned Behavior (TPB) directly assesses 
attitudes and their influence on behavior. The 
TPB has even been tested in the professional 
driving context (Newman, Watson, & Murray, 
2004). In addition, a driver’s attitude toward 
risk avoidance in general, and confidence in 
their own safety skills may affect their decision 
making (Forward, 2006; Zuckerman, 2007). An 
investigation of these factors might contribute 
to an understanding of drivers’ safety behaviors 
and can educate safety professionals on the
next steps they must take to improve safety. 
The purpose of this study is to assess the 
influence of drivers’ perceptions of safety 
climate, their propensity to avoid risk, their 
assessment of their own safety performance, 
and their attitudes on their intentions to 
commit unsafe driving actions.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
AND HYPOTHESES
Safety climate is a sub-type of organizational 
climate that reveals the shared perceptions of 
organizational members concerning the 
organization’s safety policies, procedures, and 
practices (Reichers & Schneider, 1990; Zohar, 
1980). Studies have identified a direct 
relationship between safety climate and 
behavior (e.g., Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; 
Zohar, 2000). In short, employees develop 
beliefs about the company’s actions and 
communications related to safety and 
internalize attitudes concerning the 
consequences of unsafe behaviors. Those 
attitudes impact behavioral intentions and 
future behavior.
The Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB; Ajzen 
1991) also links individual attitudes and 
behaviors. It provides a sound framework to 
study how an individual’s personal beliefs, 
referent beliefs, and control beliefs about 
unsafe actions influence his or her behavior. 
While the TPB is cited as a complete theory of 
human behavior, other factors can influence a 
person’s behavior. Two additional factors were 
considered in this study: a general aversion to 
risky behaviors and individual confidence in 
his or her ability to act safety. First, an 
individual’s tendency to avoid risk in general 
may encourage that person to shy away from 
risky driving behavior. Finally, a person’s 
attitudes about their ability to avoid an 
undesirable outcome (confidence in their 
ability to act safely) may influence whether or 
not they actually participate in a risky driving 
behavior.
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The next section introduces the concepts 
identified above. Particularly, the safety 
climate-behavior relationship, TPB, risk 
avoidance, and self-assessed ability concepts 
are developed and discussed in the context of 
driving safety. The expected relationships are 
presented through proposed hypotheses.
Safety Climate and Behavior
Safety climate has been primarily researched 
in the manufacturing, energy production, and 
health care industries. Many definitions of 
safety climate have been proposed. However, 
most studies define safety climate as the 
shared perceptions of employees concerning 
organizational actions and procedures designed 
to eliminate or reduce injuries and accidents 
(Naveh, Katz-Navon, & Stern, 2005).
Empirical evidence for the safety climate- 
behavior relationship exists. High levels of 
safety climate, such as communication of safety 
issues to employees and displays of 
management’s commitment to safety, reduce 
employee error and improve organizational 
safety (Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Wills, 
Watson, & Biggs, 2006; Zohar, 1980). Despite 
disagreement on the number of factors 
associated with safety climate, researchers 
generally agree that safety climate is best 
measured using employees’ perceptions of 
management’s attitudes and commitment to 
safety, the priority of safety within the 
organization (i.e., safety versus productivity), 
and the consistency with which safety is 
encouraged and practiced (Brown & Holmes, 
1986; Diaz & Cabrera, 1997; Flin et al., 2000; 
Griffin & Neal, 2000; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 
2003; Naveh, Katz-Navon, & Stern, 2005; Zohar, 
1980).
Waste management companies can enact 
policies and procedures that have a direct and 
positive impact on drivers’ perceptions of 
safety climate. Safety climate perceptions 
inform drivers of desired driving behaviors and
the consequences of non-compliance with 
desired behaviors. Thus, positive perceptions 
of carrier safety climate are expected to reduce 
the likelihood that drivers plan to engage in 
unsafe behaviors.
Hj: Drivers’ perceptions of company safety
climate are negatively related to 
behavioral intentions to commit unsafe 
driving actions.
The Theory of Planned Behavior and 
Driving Safety
Social scientists have long been interested in 
why people act the way they do in various 
situations, and the TPB (Ajzen, 1991) addresses 
the factors that influence those decisions. The 
TPB has become generally accepted as a 
powerful tool for understanding human 
behavior and is held by some to be a complete 
theory of human behavior (Conner & Armitage, 
1998). The TPB has been used extensively to 
predict aberrant driving behaviors such as 
speeding (Elliot, Armitage, & Baughan, 2003; 
Elliot, Armitage, & Baughan, 2005; Forward, 
2006; Newman, Watson, & Murray, 2004; 
Parker et al., 1992; Warner & Aberg, 2006) and 
reckless lane changing (Parker, Manstead, & 
Stradling, 1995). However, few studies have 
applied the TPB in a professional driving 
context (see Newman, Watson, & Murray, 2004 
for one example).
Predicting behaviors in traffic safety is 
difficult. Some research applying the TPB to 
driving behaviors has used drivers’ self- 
reported behavior (Elliot, Armitage, & 
Baughan, 2003) and actual behavior (Warner & 
Aberg, 2006). However, given the difficulty in 
assessing actual behavior, most studies 
assessed behavioral intentions (Elliot, 
Armitage, & Baughan, 2005; Forward, 2006; 
Newman, Watson, & Murray, 2004; Parker et 
al., 1992). The inherent critical assumption 
holds that drivers will ultimately perform 
those behaviors they express intent to perform.
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Given this context, the basic TPB model holds 
that three main factors will determine a 
person’s behavioral intent toward a given 
behavior: attitude, subjective norm, and 
perceived behavioral control. Behavioral 
intentions are indicated by the person’s 
likelihood to perform a behavior (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975). Attitudes are based on the 
perceived consequences of a behavior and the 
likelihood that performing the behavior will 
lead to those consequences. Subjective Norm 
refers to a person’s generalized belief about 
whether important referent persons or groups 
think he or she should (or should not) perform 
the behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). 
Perceived behavioral control consists of a 
person’s perceptions of factors that facilitate or 
inhibit their ability to perform a behavior 
(Ajzen, 1991). In other words, perceived 
behavioral control refers to whether or not the 
person feels that he or she can personally 
control the behavior. The TPB is appropriate 
for studying traffic safety because some 
behaviors, even aberrant behaviors, are 
influenced by factors outside the drivers’ direct 
control (Haglund & Aberg, 2000).
It is expected that as drivers’ attitudes and 
subjective norms reflect acceptance of unsafe 
driving actions, the more likely it will be that 
drivers will make an unsafe decision (or 
commit an unsafe act). Furthermore, the 
harder it is to avoid the unsafe behavior, the 
more likely it will be for drivers to perform the 
behavior. Conversely, if the behavior is
unacceptable to both the individual and others, 
and the person believes they can control the 
activity, then generally there will be no intent 
to commit the action.
H2: Drivers’ attitudes, subjective norms, and
perceptions of behavioral control
towards unsafe driving actions are
related (positively, positively, and 
negatively respectively) to behavioral 
intentions to commit those actions.
Risk Aversion and Self-Assessed Safety 
Performance
Two additional factors were considered in this 
study: a general aversion to risky behaviors 
and individual confidence in his or her ability 
to act safety. These were new factors tested for 
their interaction with the more traditional 
Climate and TPB model constructs. First, 
Zuckerman (2007) purported that high 
sensation seekers are more likely to engage in 
risky driving behaviors than low sensation 
seekers. Therefore, an individual’s tendency to 
avoid risk in general may encourage that 
person to shy away from risky driving behavior. 
Items related to this factor were included in 
this study in an attempt to account for 
individual personal characteristics outside of 
the effects of the other TPB factors. In other 
words, it is anticipated that when a personality 
characteristic like risk aversion is accounted 
for, the explanatory power of the TPB model 
would be improved. It is anticipated that for 
less risk tolerant/more risk averse drivers, the 
intent to commit unsafe acts would be lower.
Finally, a person’s attitudes about their ability 
to avoid an undesirable outcome (confidence in 
their ability to act safely) may influence 
whether or not they actually participate in a 
risky driving behavior. Forward (2006) found 
that drivers with confidence in their own 
driving abilities were able to withstand 
external pressure to commit risky driving 
behaviors. Therefore, this factor was added in 
support of our understanding of the role of 
safety training programs on the TPB. It is 
anticipated that increased safety training 
might improve an individuals’ self perceived 
skill at operating safely, even under adverse 
conditions. A factor was created using items 
attempting to measure a drivers’ perception of 
how safely they were able to act, when 
compared to “typical” drivers. It is proposed 
that if a driver has a higher level of self-
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assessed safety performance, they would be 
less likely to intend to commit unsafe acts.
H3: Drivers’ risk aversion and safety
assessment are negatively related to 
behavioral intentions to commit unsafe 
acts.
METHOD
The participants in this study were WMV 
drivers from a small southwestern U.S. waste 
management company. The company operates 
out of four locations in the region and 
participants for the study were employees that 
operated out of three of the locations. The 
participants were attending company- 
mandated safety meetings composed of a 
general safety awareness discussion. In this 
context the drivers were given a 15 minute pre­
sentation on adverse weather/holiday hazards 
and then administered the survey immediately 
afterward. Of 103 potential respondents, 99 
drivers volunteered to complete the survey 
(96% response rate). All data collected was 
kept strictly anonymous and confidential.
Demographics
Demographic information consists of drivers’ 
personal characteristics and experience. As 
previously mentioned, 99 drivers completed 
the survey. Relevant respondent demographics 
are presented in Table 1. Approximately 63% of 
the drivers are from Location 1, a large 
metropolitan pick up and consolidation point. 
The other 37% are from Locations 2 (slightly 
smaller metropolitan pickup and consolidation) 
and 3 (primarily residential pick up). Most of 
the drivers classify themselves as fleet drivers 
or owner-operators (65% and 14%, respec­
tively). A number of drivers did not list their 
classification (15%). All respondents are male 
(100%) and most are married (71%), with a 
large proportion of the respondents between 
the ages of 26-50 (approximately 85%). The 
majority of the drivers travel between 0-75,000 
miles per year (74%). Most drivers are paid by-
the-hour (62%) or as a percentage of revenue 
(15%). Finally, most drivers have not been 
involved in a safety event in the last year 
(60%). The other 40% of drivers have been 
involved in a “Safety Event” (accident or 
received some kind of violation) in the last 


























Late career stage (> 10 yrs) 54.5
Mid-career stage (> 2 yrs, <? 34.3
lOyrs) 10.1
Early career stage (<? 2 yrs) 1.0
Unknown
Company time
Extended (> 5 years) 23.2
Average (> 1 year, 5 years) 38.4
New (<? 1 year) 35.4
Unknown 3.0
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The drivers exhibit a broad range of experience 
ranging from 0.33 to 40 years with an average 
experience level of 13.6 years. Company tenure 
ranges from “just started” to 14 years with an 
average of 3.6 years with the company. The 
majority of the drivers are in the mid to late 
stages of their careers (i.e., > 10 years of 
experience) and the company seems to employ 
very few inexperienced drivers (i.e., < 2 years). 
Additionally, the drivers are relatively new to 
the company. Approximately 74% of the drivers 
have worked for the company for five years or 
less.
Measures
Safety climate and TPB scales were adapted 
from previous literature (i.e. Zohar and Luria, 
2005; Ajzen, 1991, 2002) and developed for the 
specific needs of this study. Surveys were pilot- 
tested with both safety professionals and a 
small group of drivers from a different 
company before being used in this study. 
Respondents voluntarily completed the survey 
and were given token incentives (i.e., pens and 
notepads) for participating.
Drivers’ perceptions of organizational safety 
climate were measured using a 10-item, 7-point 
(<disagree to agree) scale adapted from Zohar 
and Luria (2005). Based on relevance to the 
occupational context, six items were removed 
from the original 16 item instrument. The TPB 
constructs were measured with respect to 
unsafe driving actions using 5-item, 7-point 
scales, anchored by totally unacceptable to 
fairly acceptable (Drivers’ Attitudes and 
Subjective Norms), easy to avoid to hard to 
avoid (Perceived Control), and very unlikely to 
very likely (Behavioral Intentions) based on 
Ajzen (2002).
Unsafe driving actions were identified in the 
Large Truck Crash Causation (LTCC) Study 
(USDOT, 2006) and consisted of the most 
common driver actions or behavioral outcomes 
that contributed to truck-caused accidents.
Semantic differential scales were adapted to 
minimize socially desirable responding.
Risk Aversion was measured using a 5-item, 7- 
point scale based on willingness to get involved 
in non-specific risky situations. The (safety) 
Self-Assessment construct asked drivers to 
compare their personal safety performance to 
the average commercial driver against a 7- 
point scale. These were new constructs tested 
for their interaction with the more traditional 
Climate and TPB model constructs.
RESULTS
Results are presented in two sections. First, 
reliability analyses and correlations between 
constructs are shown. The second section 
includes the regression analyses used to 
explore the relationships between the 
attitudinal or perceptual constructs (as 
independent variables) and the behavioral 
intent construct as the dependent variable. 
These results provide company safety 
management with some statistical evidence of 
the influences on drivers’ behavioral intentions 
to commit unsafe driving actions.
Reliability and Correlation Analyses
Construct validity was performed using Factor 
Analysis and measured with the Cronbach’s 
Alpha. Some items were removed from the 
proposed constructs after pilot testing and a 
reassessment of face validity by the 
researchers (see Appendix A, Survey 
Instrument). One item was removed from the 
Climate scale (regularity of safety awareness 
events). All items remained in the self-assessed 
safety performance items SA1-SA5, and risk 
avoidance items RA1-RA5, as these were new 
constructs to be investigated by the research in 
an exploratory fashion. One item was dropped 
from all TPB constructs (use of over the 
counter medications). This item was originally 
included due to its presence in the LTCC 
study. However, as the remaining factors
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(speeding, performing a prohibited maneuver, 
and performing an improper lane change) were 
all volitional driving actions and the use of 
medication was not a volitional driving action, 
it was dropped for relevance. The items related 
to following too closely were not reliable 
enough to include in the analysis. It is 
proposed that for the type of congested 
metropolitan driving performed by the WMV 
drivers, this act was not as relevant as it would 
be for long-haul drivers.
Factor Analysis was used to assess the 
reliability of the constructs. The Climate 
variables C1-C9 were found to be reliable 
measures of safety climate and were included 
in the climate factor. All five items were found 
to be reliably related for both Self Assessed 
safety performance and Risk Avoidance. The 
TPB factors of Attitude (Al, 3, 4), Subjective 
Norm (SN1, 3, 4), Perceived Control (PCI, 3, 4),
and Behavioral Intentions (BI1, 3, 4) were all 
found to be reliable overall measures.
The metrics used to assess reliability are listed 
on Table 2, with the Cronbach’s Alpha in the 
diagonal where each factor is crossed with 
itself. Values greater than 0.70 are generally 
considered reliable (Nunnally, 1978). All of our 
factors were considered to be reliable, ranging 
from a low of 0.78 up to a high of 0.92 for the 
factors. The validity of the exploratory 
constructs Risk Aversion and Self Assessed 
safety performance were both found to be 
internally reliable.
Results of the correlation analysis are also 
presented in Table 2. Correlations that were 
significant at the 0.10 level or better are 
indicated in bold; those better than the 0.01 
level are bold and indicated with an asterisk.
TABLE 2
CORRELATIONS FOR KEY CONSTRUCTS
Variables C SA RA ATT SN PC BI
Climate (C) (.92)
Self Assessment (SA) 0.58* (.89)
Risk Avoidance (RA) 0.38* 0.71* (.78)
Attitude (ATT) -0.05 -0.11 -0.18 (.84)
Subjective Norm (SN) -0.17 -0.16 -0.18 0.58* (.92)
Perceived Behavioral Control 
(PC) -0.01 -0.06 -0.11 0.43* 0.49* (.89)
Behavioral Intentions (BI) -0.06 -0.24* -0.29* 0.49* 0.45* 0.53* (-89)
^Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)
Correlation is significant at the .10 level (2-tailed)
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Safety climate, self-assessed safety 
performance, and risk avoidance are highly and 
significantly related to each other. This finding 
implies that drivers who rate themselves as 
safer than other drivers are also likely to rate 
the company’s safety climate higher. Those 
drivers who tend to avoid risk in general are 
also more likely to rate the company’s safety 
climate higher. Finally, drivers who rate 
themselves as safer than others are also more 
likely to be risk averse.
Strong and significant relationships exist 
among the TPB variables. Attitude, subjective 
norm, and perceived behavioral control are all 
positively related to behavioral intentions. This 
finding is as expected. That is, drivers who find 
unsafe actions more acceptable are likely to 
have higher intentions to perform those 
actions. Drivers who believe their friends, 
family, and co-workers find certain unsafe 
actions more acceptable are likely to have 
higher intentions to commit those actions. 
Finally, the less control drivers perceived they 
have over performing unsafe actions, the 
higher their intentions to commit those actions. 
These findings will be discussed again in the 
regression analysis.
Finally, self-assessed safety performance and 
risk avoidance have a significant inverse 
relationship with behavioral intentions. In 
other words, drivers who assess their safety 
performance as higher than others have lower 
intentions to commit unsafe actions. Similarly, 
drivers who are risk averse have lower 
intentions to commit unsafe actions. Drivers’ 
perceptions of company safety climate are not 
related to behavioral intentions.
Regression Analysis
Correlation analysis was followed by 
regression analysis. The results are presented 
in Tables 3 and 4. The Stepwise Regression 
procedure was used first for all of the factors of 
interest used in the study (C, SA, RA, ATT, SN, 
and PC; Table 3). The technique was then
applied to the Climate and TPB factors only (C, 
ATT, SN, and PC; Table 4). In both cases the 
factors were used to predict Behavioral 
Intention (BI). The inclusion threshold was set 
at a significance level of 0.10 or better.
When looking at all the factors, a few findings 
were noteworthy (Table 3). Overall, the model 
was very reliable (F Significance) and powerful 
(adjusted R2). In contrast with the results of the 
correlation analysis, self-assessed safety 
performance and subjective norm were found to 
provide little additional power in predicting 
Behavioral Intention. Climate was not found to 
be significant in either the correlation analysis 
or the regression analysis.
In contrast, perceived behavioral control, 
attitude, and risk aversion constructs have a 
significant influence on behavioral intentions. 
Drivers who perceived various unsafe driving 
actions as more acceptable were more likely to 
commit those actions in the future. 
Furthermore, the harder it was for drivers to 
control whether or not they performed unsafe 
driving actions, the higher their intentions to 
commit those actions in the future. Those 
drivers who were generally more risk averse 
(uncomfortable with risky situations) were also 
less likely to consider performing the unsafe 
acts.
When only the climate and TPB factors were 
looked at, the results were a little different 
(Table 4). This model was also very reliable (F 
Significance) and powerful (adjusted R2; 
slightly less than the “full” model). Contrary to 
expectations, drivers’ subjective norms (how 
people close to them felt about the drivers 
performing unsafe actions) did not have a 
significant effect on behavioral intentions. One 
plausible explanation is that most drivers are 
not regularly subject to the perceptions of close 
friends and family while driving professionally. 
The results may be different when driving their 
personal vehicle. Furthermore, professional 
drivers make numerous split second decisions, 
and do not have the time to think about the
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TABLE 3




Intercept 3.020 .001 .852
Perceived Control .418 .000 .098
Attitude .308 .002 .096
Risk Aversion -.308 .022 .132
F Significance (reliability) .000
Adjusted R2 (strength) .375
Entered those factors that were statistically significant at 0.10 or better
TABLE 4
HIERARCHICAL REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
FOR KEY CONSTRUCTS (TPB VARIABLES)
Variable Behavioral Intent
P Sig Std Error
Intercept 1.223 .001 .368
Perceived Control .426 .000 .100
Attitude .341 .001 .097
F Significance (reliability) .000
Adjusted R2 (strength) .346




Please tell us how much you disagree or agree with the following statements:
Top management in this company... Disagree Agree
Reacts quickly to solve the problem when told about a safety issue. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Provides all the equipment needed to do the job safely. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Is strict about driving safely even when deliveries fall behind schedule. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Quickly corrects any safety issue (even if it’s costly). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Provides detailed safety reports to employees (e.g., accidents, violations) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Invests a lot of time and money in safety training for drivers. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Listens carefully to employees’ ideas about improving safety. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Considers safety when setting delivery windows and schedules. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Provides employees with a lot of information on safety issues. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Regularly holds safety-awareness events (e.g., presentations, 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Compared to the average commercial driver on the road, I . . . Disagree Agree
Have a much better safety record. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strictly follow all company safety policies and recommendations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Set the example for others to follow in terms of safe practices. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Abide by all Federal, State, and Local safety regulations. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Have a much better track record for inspections and enforcement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Compared to the average commercial driver on the road, I . . . Disagree Agree
Am very cautious and approach risks carefully.
Tend to “sit things out” rather than take any chances. 
Avoid putting myself in stressful situations.
Generally think things through quite a bit before acting. 
Don’t like to get involved in new situations.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Please give us your reaction to the following issues:
How acceptable is it to you personally to perform the following 
actions while driving commercially:
Exceed the posted speed limit in “built up” areas 
Follow too closely
Perform a prohibited maneuver (U-Turn, rolling stop, etc.)
Perform an improper lane change





1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Table 4 
(continued)
How acceptable is it to people close to you (family, friends, Totally Fairly
coworkers) that you perform the following actions while Unaccept- Accept
driving commercially: able able
Exceed the posted speed limit in “built up” areas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Follow too closely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perform a prohibited maneuver (U-Turn, rolling stop, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perform an improper lane change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use over the counter medication with a “Do not operate heavy 
equipment” warning
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
How easy or hard is it for you to control whether or not you
perform the following actions while driving commercially (easy Very Easy Very Hard
to avoid/hard to avoid):
Exceed the posted speed limit in “built up” areas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Follow too closely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perform a prohibited maneuver (U-Turn, rolling stop, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perform an improper lane change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use over the counter medication with a “Do not operate heavy 
equipment” warning
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
How likely is it that you will perform any of the following 






Exceed the posted speed limit in “built up” areas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Follow too closely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perform a prohibited maneuver (U-Turn, rolling stop, etc.) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Perform an improper lane change 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Use over the counter medication with a “Do not operate heavy 
equipment” warning
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
perceptions of close friends and family. After 
the event has happened, this would affect their 
assessment of the role of those opinions on 
their own attitudes. Finally, some drivers 
might think that anything other than people’s 
acceptance of their driving behavior is an 
indication of people’s distrust of the driver to 
make good decisions. Thus, the driver 
dismisses others’ opinions unless the opinions 
fit the driver’s attitudes (Forward, 2006).
Also surprising was the lack of effect from the 
climate variable. Apparently, the drivers’ 
perception of the company safety climate did
not correspond closely to their expressed 
behavioral intention. This was also supported 
by the correlation analysis discussed earlier. 
The most common explanation would be that if 
the climate variable were excessively “noisy” (a 
wide variation between answers on the climate 
items for each driver) it would fail to be 
accepted by the model due to reliability. 
However, the reliability score of 0.92 (from 
Table 2) would rule that explanation out. It 
could be that the drivers had strong (reliably 
consistent) opinions about the company safety 
climate, their opinions were not associated 
with their likelihood to commit an unsafe act.
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In other words, their intentions were 
“indifferent” to how they perceived the safety 
climate.
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
This study provides important managerial 
implications. The findings suggest that, in this 
context, carrier management should focus on 
influencing drivers’ attitudes towards and 
perceived control over unsafe driving actions. 
Also, screening of drivers for risk aversion may 
be helpful in this regard as well. However, 
studies have found that it is difficult to change 
attitudes because they are deeply rooted. 
Perhaps drivers’ perceptions of the value of 
various safety practices may be used to inform 
management of potential courses of action to 
influence attitudes and perceived control.
Training and company support have 
traditionally been considered important 
influences of safe driving habits. Results from 
previous studies have indicated that effective 
training events may be a key to influencing 
drivers’ attitudes. These events, however, must 
solicit consistent, active involvement from 
participants in classroom or interactive 
computer-based settings (Elliot, Armitage, & 
Baughn, 2005). Various types and venues of 
training coupled with a training partnership 
between drivers and carrier management may 
be a key to influence drivers’ attitudes towards 
safety (Mejza et al., 2003). This study found no 
support for a direct link between safety climate 
perceptions and behavioral intent; however, 
evidence suggests that climate may have an
indirect effect on behavioral intentions by 
influencing self-assessed safety skills and risk 
aversion.
More specifically, training can be used to relay 
the potential consequences of safe and unsafe 
actions. It seems that company management 
does a great job conveying safety information to 
drivers. However, operational policies may 
counteract the effect of the information as was 
indicated in drivers’ perceptions of safety 
climate. In other words, drivers might view the 
consequences of unsafe actions (i.e., speeding) 
as related to gains rather than losses. Safety 
training programs that focus on the positive 
consequences of safe behavior are likely to 
influence drivers’ attitudes towards safety and, 
in turn, behavioral intentions (Forward, 2006).
Overall, more research is needed to determine 
which practices have the most effect on 
attitudes, perceived control, and behavioral 
intentions. This study is a good first step to 
identifying attitudes and perceived behavioral 
control as important influences of drivers’ 
behavioral intentions to commit unsafe acts. 
Narrowing down the most important influences 
will get to the heart of the safety issue and 
management will ultimately be able to 
understand focus on the appropriate 
influencing factors. Also, the contribution of 
the new attitudinal constructs of risk aversion 
and self-assessed safety performance merit 
further investigation. Future research should 
also consider a broader sample of drivers 
working in different occupational contexts, as 
well as a larger number of participants.
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